Foreword:
From the earliest of times, we have been observing the world around us. Through our senses we perceive the external world and ourselves. Through observation we focus on specific perceptions, sometimes out of necessity and sometimes out of curiosity. Observation is fundamental for survival; it also provides food for the mind. From observation come reflexive and reasoned actions, creative expressions, and emotional responses. Our observations affect all of our intellectual endeavors, and have played a critical role in science.
In this essay, I will examine how observation has been used and viewed throughout the history of science. Over time we have become aware of the many factors influencing the making, interpretation and communication of scientific observations. This awareness has in turn influenced the use of observation and has further impacted on the philosophical consideration of the nature of scientific knowledge and of the nature of reality. This is intended as a general summary and is therefore limited in scope. Rather than try to cover all areas of science, examples will primarily, but not exclusively, be taken from physics and the human sciences. I apologize for the losses incurred because of this limitation. It is my hope however, to convey the interesting progression of critical ideas over time and to show how the role of observation changes in practice and in opinion.
In deciding when and where to begin this history, I needed to consider the definition and domain of science. Science, in its broadest sense, is seen as a means of understanding the world. It generally refers to both an organized body of knowledge about the physical world as well as to the attitudes and methods used to acquire this knowledge.[1] This description of science offers little to dispute, but as soon as the principles of organization, the goals, the attitudes and methods are clarified and the demarcation between fields is drawn, the debate begins.
Alternative ways of viewing and using science have existed throughout history and are distinctive to different cultures, from the Ojibwa perspective of science “as the descriptive knowledge of Nature developed through the experience with Nature”[2] to the Islamic view of science as a means of showing “the unity and interrelatedness of all that exists, so that, in contemplating the unity of the cosmos, man may be led to the unity of the Divine Principle, of which the unity of Nature is the image.”[3] In modern western culture, science is seen as “the knowledge acquired by careful observation, by deduction of the laws that govern changes and conditions, and by the testing of these deductions by experiment.”[4] This essay will focus primarily on the development of the western image of science and the role of observation in the attainment of knowledge about the universe. The western image of science has not arisen in isolation, its roots reach far back in time and it has been shaped by nonwestern influences some of which I have attempted to include.
In the Beginning there was
Observation: before the written word
Evidence
for the manufacture of stone tools dating back some 2,400,000 years indicates
that early hominids learned how to employ elements of nature to improve their
chances of survival. It is supposed that
a process of trial and error and fortuitous events led to the slow and
discontinuous progress towards more effective technologies. Bunch and Helleman suggest that technology,
the desire to control nature preceded science, which they define as the
systematic investigation of nature.[5] I would argue instead that technology is the
application of science. Early homonids
had to have had a rudimentary understanding of natural events (e.g. life and
death) based on observations, and the recognition of causal or correlational
relationships. With this knowledge, they were then able to recognize and
produce implements that allowed them some control of their environment. This can be viewed as elemental science
constituted by observation, trial and error, and judgment of cause and
effect.
The
transformation from stone age to bronze age to iron age required that some observant
person discovered something new about the world and was able to share that
knowledge. Copper will not melt out of
ore in an ordinary fire, someone had to observe molten copper and recognize the
conditions necessary to produce it.
Mixing tin with copper produces a harder metal; someone had to compare
and test mixtures. “To derive iron from
ore, it was necessary to heat the ore in combination with charcoal to high
temperatures for several hours, the charcoal capturing released oxygen and the
ore thus releasing a shiny metal. Then this metal had to be freed of its
remaining brittle impurities by reheating, pounding, and reheating - the more
the better. Heating alone will not do it; the removal of oxygen from the ore is
an essential step, and one must wonder how the first person thought of it, or
recognized it, if the combination was serendipitous!”[6]
It is hard to imagine that the production of iron was entirely
serendipitous. Given prior knowledge of
how to isolate copper and bronze and other alloys, it is probable that the
individual who discovered the shiny iron metal may have been ‘experimenting’
with various ore samples and extraction techniques. Without documentation it is difficult to know
what systematic methodology or what reasoning, if any was employed.
Documentation does exist for the
practice of elemental science not related to technology. Samples of paleolithic
art dating back over 40,000 years indicate that early peoples made careful
observation and study of their surroundings.
“The earliest cave paintings portray scientific reality, for these were
didactic images, not merely decorative additions. We may deduce this from the
fact that many of the images are found in secluded regions deep within a cave,
where initiates might be admitted. Further substantiation lies in the way that
arrows are sometimes used to draw attention to a significant structure - a
target for which the hunter should aim, for example.”[7]
Cave drawings appear to have had several purposes one of which seems to be
as a means of organizing and sharing knowledge about the behavior and
appearance of animals. Barry Sinervo
noted that the distinction between herding animals and solitary animals is
depicted in many drawings and goes on to speculate that, “primitive man could readily have exploited
the differences in behaviors associated with herding versus solitary animals to
capture prey. Animals that travel in herds could have been driven over cliffs
in large numbers provided that lead animals were first driven over the precipice.”[8] The Paleolithic illustrators who observed and
preserved the appearance and behavior of the animals in their surroundings are
the progenitors of the modern paleozoologists for whom they have provided
invaluable scientific evidence. The
drawing below from the
It is possible to surmise, even
without written documentation of the thought processes of early peoples, that
the rudiments of scientific practice preexisted the ancient Greeks who are
normally credited with the birth of western science. My intention, in dwelling on pre-historical
and pre-lingual indications of scientific activity, is to indicate that there
is something fundamental about the nature of people (and I would even argue of
animals) and their ability to observe.
A Desire to Understand or A Desire to Control
Western
historians of science have often neglected significant contributions of early
peoples, even the immediate antecedents of the Greeks in the Middle
East or Far East . For instance, in The Babylonian Theory of
the Planets, Noel Swerdlow describes how the Babylonians began
systematically observing the planetary motions from about the 8th
and continued up until the first Century B.C.
These continuous scientific records known as the ‘Astronomical Diaries’
became the empirical foundation of mathematical astronomy. He also argues that the
mathematical theory they developed to predict planetary behavior is the origin
of mathematical science, as we know it today.[10] The Hindus in India Europe
by the Arabs.[11]
The Chinese inventions of paper, gunpowder, silk, the magnetic compass and
their careful astronomical observations are in a like manner often ignored in
indications of early scientific practice and yet these discoveries have all
contributed to modern scientific knowledge.
Politics, prejudice and lack of historical documentation are partly to
blame for the exclusion of these contributions in western histories of science.
Another reason
that many early scientific endeavors were dismissed is that supernatural
explanations for natural phenomena were entangled with natural
explanations. Thus the Babylonian
‘astronomers’ or ‘astrologers’ were looking for omens from the Sumerian gods. (For
example on the clay tablets the scribes write, "If Jupiter [rises] in the
path of the [Enlil] stars: the king of Akkad will become strong and [overthrow]
his enemies in all lands in battle" (BTP, p. 94).) Hence ‘science’ was often commingled with beliefs
about gods, magic and or supernatural powers.
When the Greeks introduced the revolutionary idea that the world could
be understood solely in terms of natural causes in the 6th century
B.C, “the world was far from ready to embrace it. At this stage, humanity still
clutched the superstitions carried out of cave and forest. And so, with a few
exceptions, naturalism lay largely dormant for two millennia while human
cultures continued to be dominated by supernatural thinking.”[12]
The Greeks were not alone in contemplating
the nature of the world. It is
interesting to note that during the same period in
Although there were early alchemists who claimed to be Taoists, this was considered corrupt. “The earliest reference to alchemy (in Eastern and Western literature) is in the 'Shi-chi', written about eighty-five B.C., but the 'Chou'-i ts'an t'ung ch'i' of Wei Po-yang (c.200 A.D.) was probably the first major alchemical text to use a Taoist work to this end, [as a philosophical foundation] . . . This form of alchemy was referred to by the’ Philosophical Taoists’ as 'debased Taoism'.”[14] The Philosophical Taoists believe that there is an underlying principle for the universe, the Tao, which can be understood using reason, (cognitive knowledge) and experience, (connotative knowledge); but to know Tao is distinct from understanding. To know Tao requires being one with Tao. The path to knowing is laid out in the Tao Te Ching. Thus to the Chinese Taoist observation was just one way in which to learn about the world.
Western
science evolved from a different combination of beliefs about the nature of the
universe. The ‘knowability’ of reality,
the path to knowledge, and the idea that it was okay to tinker with the world,
investigate and shape it were ideas introduced by the early Greeks. The most influential to science were Plato
and Aristotle. These philosophers laid out fundamental ideas about knowledge
and the methods for attaining knowledge.
Plato’s greatest contribution to science was the assumption that the
universe was intelligible to human reason.
He believed (like the Taoists) that there was a unity underlying
perceived objects and that through reason (logic and mathematics for instance)
knowledge about the fundamental ‘forms’ (similar to the modern laws of nature)
could be attained. Influenced by
Heraclitus, Plato was concerned that true knowledge could not be attained
through sense data, observation. Although
the real world existed independent of the mind, the senses could only yield
images or reflections of that real world.[15] His pupil Aristotle debated this concept with
him. Aristotle believed that the world
could be known through objective observation.
He himself used observation to learn about the world and for instance
was the first to classify dolphins as mammals. He asserted that “sense
perception proper, free from any admixture of association and interpretation,
is infallible . . . For perception does not arise by our own volition. It is stimulated by something or other, and
this must be something independent of that which it stimulates.[16] Using a combination of observation of
natural phenomenon and deductive syllogism, Aristotle believed that knowledge
of the universe could be attained. The western debate about whether the real
world can be known through observation was formally initiated.
Simultaneously
other early Greeks were making contributions to science. Democritus proposed that the universe was
composed indivisible atoms, Phythagoras tried to explain the universe in terms
of mathematics (again it is important to note that the Phythagorean theorem was
developed independently in other parts of the world)[17],
Hippocrates developed a system for making diagnosis of disease based on
observed symptoms. “Anaximander had an
idea of what is meant by adaptation to environment and survival of the fittest,
and that he saw the higher mammals could not represent the original type of
animal.”[18]
Two science
historians note however that “not
everything about the way the Greeks looked at the world was productive . . .
Most of the Greek philosophers relied too heavily on subjective thought and
intellectual exercises and too little on observation or experiment. Their concepts originated primarily within
their minds: They developed ideas about
how nature should work and then tried to fit nature to their ideas.”[19] This might be said of modern scientists as
well.
A Jump to the Scientific Method: The Primacy of Observation
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) would have agreed with that assessment of the Greeks’ reliance on rhetoric and in particular on Aristotle’s use of deductive syllogisms to argue proofs of form and cause. Some two thousand years after Aristotle’s death, the concepts he raised were still being debated. In a time when control and productivity were mindsets, Bacon and others were trying to create rules for all processes, thus rules for gaining knowledge. Bacon recognized that humans were fallible that judgment could be affected by numerous sources, or idols as he termed them. In order to avoid mistakes, Bacon suggested a methodology.
“The
method for understanding nature Bacon holds to be the most significant is that
of the bee which gathers the pollen of the flower, changes it through its own
efforts, and then uses it. According to Bacon, we must observe and collect
experiences, analyze exactly what we know, then act on the most reliable
facts.”[20] This is an inductive process in contrast to
Aristotle’s deductive reasoning, which Bacon equated to a spider manufacturing
webs from his own substance. To Bacon
knowledge was power (scientia potestas est) and science (scientia:
the latin word for knowledge in use from about the 14th century) was
a systematic means to obtain knowledge.
Bacon was a contemporary of Galileo
Galilei (1564-1642) who along with Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) and Johannes Kepler
(1571-1630) methodologically examined the Copernican view of the universe. The Copernican system had been introduced by
Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543) in the year of his death. Copernicus had
offered an alternative theory, a mathematical hypothesis for explaining the
discrepancies between the observed world and the traditional Ptolemic view of
the universe.[21] His heliocentric conception of the universe
was highly controversial and contrary to predominantly Christian views of the
time. Thus scientists set out to critically examine the possibilities.
With the
use of the newly invented telescope[22]
astronomers were able to make more detailed observations and positional
measurements of the planets. These
observations gave some support for the sun-centered Copernican system. Galileo publicly supported the new theory and
was shortly charged with heresy and sentenced to prison. Only a forced apology won him his
freedom. It is interesting to note that
although Kepler had demonstrated through mathematical models that the planetary
orbits were elliptical rather than circular, as Copernicus had posited, Galileo
did not seem to accept Kepler’s laws of planetary motion. Influenced by his
beliefs in perfect forms, he seems to have ignored the inconsistency between
circular orbits and observations.
Galileo was not averse however to using
mathematics himself. He combined observation
with calculation and rigorous mental comparisons. He used the Platonic
methodology of idealized forms and Aristotelian thought experiments to deduce
whether his ideas were consistent with experience. In particular, his thought experiment to prove
that all bodies fall at the same speed, although grounded in experience seems
to suggest a result contrary to the ‘real world’ observations made by Aristotle
and yet he was able to conclude that Aristotle had been mistaken. This imaginative method proved to be very
successful in advancing our scientific understanding of the natural world.
The Church
did not dissuade Galileo from his understanding of the phenomenon he observed
and his carefully reasoned theories, but did have a profound influence on the
philosophical debate about reality and knowledge of it. Rene Descartes, (1596-1650) like Bacon or
others of his time, was looking for methods, rules and procedures to “achieve
the efficacious,”[23]
and also like Bacon he was rejecting the methodologies of Aristotle. However, Descartes position was quite
different from Bacon’s. He refuted
Aristotle’s belief that knowledge could be acquired from the senses – sense
perception was self-deception. Beginning
with the only true knowledge, that is the knowledge that ‘I am’ (I exist
as a thinking being, a soul, regardless of the physical body), he argues that
God too exists. He then proposed that
God created a mechanistic or clockwork universe composed of matter (defined as
extended substance and motion) and the human soul. The mind knows the material world and can
interact with matter. Although somewhat
unclear on how the mind interacts with the body, Descartes believed that
knowledge of the world came through reason based on innate ideas. Like Plato, Descartes felt that mathematics
and logic could be used to explain the world.
He developed a system of analytical geometry, which he believed could be
used to predict the behavior of matter in the physical world. Although Cartesian
physics was short lived, Cartesian dualism (the separation of mind or soul and
body) has had a profound influence on the progress of science in particular on
the development of the human sciences.
Roger Smith comments, “This may explain why the modern human sciences
remain divided on basic issues, and why the human and natural sciences have an
ambivalent relationship.”[24]
It also had a profound effect on how the phenomena or perception and
observation were viewed.
Isaac Newton (1643-1727) was able to synthesize the discoveries and
philosophies of the late 15th Century. Building upon the observations of Brahe,
Kepler and Galileo, utilizing experimental methodology and inductive reasoning
of Bacon and applying the analytical, mathematical, approach of Descartes,
Newton was able develop his elegant laws of motion and his theory of
gravitation. He outlined his own rules for scientific reasoning in the Principia:[25]
RULE I.
We are to admit no more causes of natural things than
such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.
RULE II.
Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far
as possible, assign the same causes.
RULE III.
The qualities of bodies, which admit neither
intension nor remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies
within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities
of all bodies whatsoever.
RULE IV.
In experimental philosophy we are to look upon
propositions collected by general induction from phænomena as accurately or
very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined,
till such time as other phænomena occur, by which they may either be made more
accurate, or liable to exceptions.
In Newton’s clockwork universe, all phenomena of
nature have a discoverable secret an underlying force of law that can be
discovered through observation, induction, and reason. Although Newton made
great use of thought experiments, and mathematics “he legitimized his
conclusions with a defense of the value of observation.”[26]
Also claiming
that knowledge should be acquired through observation and experience was a
close friend of Newton’s, John Locke (1632-1704). Whereas Descartes had argued people could
have innate ideas, Locke believed ideas had to come from experience. “Without experience, no characters are
written on the ‘tablets’ of the mind; except through the ‘windows’ of sensation
and reflection, no light enters the understanding.”[27]
Locke did not reject all of Descartes ideas.
He still maintained the duality of self and that the existence of self
could be known through intuition. Also like Descartes, Locke believed that
mathematics and logic could be understood solely through reason for they do not
express ideas about the real world and therefore knowledge of them could be firmly
established and there truth determined.
Locke’s
ideas about learning through experience were both extended and refuted by
George Berkeley (1685-1753). Berkeley
agreed that some ideas were learned by experience, “imprinted on the senses by
the Author of nature” but others arose solely in the imagination. In addition Berkeley viewed sense information
as giving the individual only discrete and disconnected units of information
about the real world. It was the mind
that assembled this information to construct an image of the world. He felt that "No object exists apart
from the mind; mind is therefore the deepest reality; it is the prius,
both in thought and existence, if for a moment we assume the popular
distinction between the two."[28]
Influenced by Locke and Descartes, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) tried to reconcile their beliefs about scientific knowledge: “There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. … In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins. But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.”[29]
He
asserted that although knowledge itself comes from experience, the mind must
use reason to structure that knowledge. Kant considered the concepts like
causality to be “the rules by which perception and experience are united into a
single consciousness, through a mental activity called "synthesis."”[30]
Kant was a contemporary of David Hume (1711-1776) with whom he clashed on various topics. Both Hume and Kant were interested in understanding the human condition. Inspired by Newton, David Hume desired to establish the ‘science of man’ based on observation and the formulation of general principles. In his quest to understand man, he asked fundamental questions concerning how one acquires knowledge. He asked:
“What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact? the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation? it may be replied in one word, EXPERIENCE.”[31]
Although Hume believed that reliable knowledge could only be obtained through sense experiences, he came upon a paradox. Observation provides only a single instance of an occurrence from which generalities cannot be assumed. Hume argues that there is no logical justification for inductive reasoning and it is simply done by force of habit.[32] This leads Hume to the conclusion that our beliefs about what is true are not the result of a rational process but an involuntary reaction. Hume asserts that, “Human belief is the product of various instinctive mechanisms, and the same mechanisms can be seen at work in other animals.”[33] Thus Hume argued that induction was still a reasonable practice. In 1776, a fellow Scotsman, Richard Price defended inductivism to the Royal Society using the Thomas Bayes (1702-1761) work on probability, but the arguments were not well accepted at the time, (however, “modern Bayensians provide a powerful response to Hume’s inductive skepticism and an interesting response to metaphysical skepticism”[34]). Later, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) would try again unsuccessfully to defend induction with his principle of the Uniformity of Nature but his arguments were not generally accepted.
The
scientific revolution was made possible by a paradigm shift, a new worldview
-the view that the world functions like a machine which can be understood using
systematic methodologies, including systematic doubt, sensory and experimental
verification, and the application of reasoning.
Despite the logical uncertainty of inductive practices, the empirical
method outlined by Bacon and inductive reasoning was the dominant “way of
knowing” from the 17th to the 18th century. Scientific discoveries proliferated. Although
Peter Medawar has commented, “We cannot browse over the fields of nature like
cows at pasture,” everywhere the ‘enlightened’ observer looked was something on
which to feast. From telescopes to
microscopes, tools for investigation were opening up new areas for observation.
Hooke, Swammerdam and Leeuwenhoek were the first to explore the microscopic
world. Cavendish, Priestly and Lavoisier
advanced knowledge in chemistry. Otto
von Guerick, Gray, and Franklin experimented with electricity. Using just his eyes and reason, Karl von
Linne described the morphological relationship among living creatures.[35] New branches of science began forming with
new methodologies.
Different
Conceptions of Reality in the 19th Century
Strict
adherence to Bacon’s empirical method began to give way as the 19th
century approached and a wider variety of methods became acceptable to the scientific
community.[36] Intuition or hunches, thought experiments,
idealized models, and mathematical proofs were used for both justification and
explanation. Scientists made tremendous
advances in understanding natural phenomenon, e.g.: Faraday, Ampere and
Maxwell’s contributions to electromagnetic theory, Darwin and Wallace’s theory
of evolution; Gregor Mendel’s laws of genetics, Daltons theory of the atom.
However
while scientists plugged away at explaining the physical world there continued
to be a debate over whether these explanations were based in reality or were
creations of the mind. Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) followed Kant in asserting that knowledge came from
the mind itself and not from the collection of observations. He believed that understanding the world was
a philosophical endeavor of the conscious mind not requiring experience of the
external world. Understanding reality or the Absolute required a
process of self-development using a dialectic process similar to that employed
by the early Greeks. He believed that
“what is rational is real and what is real is rational.”[37]
In contrast Auguste Compte (1798-1857)
believed that by using the methods of observation and experimentation knowledge
of all natural phenomenon could be understood including the social phenomenon
of mankind. He further believed that
with a scientific understanding of the natural laws governing the world, the
progress of mankind could be directed toward a superior state.”[38]
Darwin’s theory of evolution gave indirect support to this conception and to
others who believed in the validity of observation.
Darwin’s
theory of evolution has had a most profound affect on science, philosophy and
society in general. G. H. Lewis
commented that evolutionary thought supposed “that everywhere throughout Nature
– including therein all moral and social phenomena – the processes are
subordinated to unchangeable Law.”[39] For instance, Herbert Spencer (1802-1903)
looked for ways to apply evolutionary theory in both psychology and sociology. Indeed many other individuals tried to apply
Darwin’s ideas and sought observations to justify particular beliefs and
sometimes morally bankrupt theories, e.g. Thomas Huxley, Sigmund Freud, Carl
Marx, Adolf Hilter, David Jordan.
Evolutionary thinking also impacted on the notion of mind-body
separation, as did physiological research on the brain.
Investigations of the brain
by Franz Gall (1758-1828) produced evidence that the mind dwelt within the
brain, and that consciousness was a function of the brain. This was highly
controversial then (and still today) and contravened Hegelian and Kantian
thinking. Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) carried out further experimental research
on stimuli, perception, and feeling. He initiated the field of experimental psychology
arguing that observation of the conscious mind, rather than philosophical
inference would yield information about the nature of mind.[40] He did not however argue that mind and brain
were one.
The experiments of Herman
von Helmholtz (1791-1895) convinced him that all knowledge came through the
senses. Ernst Mach extended this idea
and claimed “scientific investigation can be understood only in terms of
experiences, or ‘sensations,’ present in the observation of phenomena. This
view leads to the position that no statement in natural science is admissible
unless and to the extent that it is empirically verifiable. This led Mach to
reject concepts such as absolute time and space.”[41]
Mach also concluded that scientific theory was a fallible construction
contingent on historical conditioning and only understandable in historical
context.[42]
The Limits
of Observation in the Explosive 20th Century: The Borderlines of
Science
Within the 20th Century,
science exploded into numerous branches each with an extraordinary number of
discoveries. For the purposes of this
paper, I will examine a few significant events within the field of physics. I choose physics because it is often looked
upon as an exemplar of scientific practice and physics has been successful in
explaining and predicting all directly observable phenomenon. However at the limits of observation, the
theories have become more questionable and the acceptance of ideas as ‘truth’
more problematic.
Perhaps it began with a strange observation, an
observation that didn’t fit. If a
blackbody like coal absorbs almost all frequencies of light, why does it not upon
heating radiate all frequencies as well? Max Planck played with the
possibilities in his mind, conducting myriad thought experiments. Only by assuming that energy could be emitted
in quanta, (discrete units), Max could mathematically explain the observations. Albert Einstein tried and successfully
employed Planck’s quantum theory to explain the perplexing photoelectric effect
observed by Hertz in 1887. Einstein then
went on to apply the concept to the observations of Michelson and Morley. By assuming that light travels in quanta at
constant speed relative to other motion, Einstein developed his theory of
relativity. Einstein’s friend and
colleague Neils Bohr applied Planck’s quantum theory to the atom. At last Fraunhofer’s lines, which Kirchhoff had
identified as characteristic of individual elements could be explained. Each element must produce light quanta of
particular energies when electrons within that element’s atoms move. In order for the electrons to emit discrete
energies they must be moving between discrete orbits.
The idea of quanta could not explain all
observations. Sometimes light behaved as
a particle, but sometimes it behaved as a wave as did, claimed de Broglie,
other subatomic particles. Schrodinger
showed that the two concepts could be reconciled mathematically and that
electrons were “matter waves.”[43] Hiesenberg examined Schrodinger’s equations
and further concluded that only the probabilities of an electron’s position and
any point in time could be determined and therefore its position and velocity
were uncertain. Put in other terms,
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle suggested that there was a limit to our
ability to know. Despite efforts to persuade
him, Einstein never accepted the uncertainty principle. The philosophical implications bothered him,
“God does not play dice.” But Bohr
responded by saying, "There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract
quantum mechanical description."
Disputes and interpretations of the quantum universe
have continued throughout the last century.
The Copenhagen Interpretation suggests that the very process of
observation disturbs the phenomenon being observed. Therefore according to this interpretation some
have assumed “that there does NOT exist any reality or any laws of nature independent
of the observer.”[44] Thus reality is observer created. An alternative perspective presented by von
Weizsäcker (1971) suggests that the Copenhagen Interpretation follows the
principle: "What is observed certainly exists; about what is not observed
we are still free to make suitable assumptions. We use that freedom to avoid
paradoxes."[45] This is just one of many interpretations in
the quantum mechanical world. As Richard
Feynman quipped, “I think I can safely say that no one understands quantum mechanics.”
Although quantum theory renewed the ageless
philosophical debates about the nature of reality and the nature of knowledge,
scientists continue to believe that the nature of the world can be understood
through observation. Despite the philosophical implications of Schrodinger’s
paradoxical ‘blackbox’, Ernest Lawrence invented the cyclotron (1931) to probe
the atoms nucleus allowing such notable scientists as Murray Gell-Mann, Madame
Wu to indirectly observe and investigate the subatomic world. Discoveries of hadrons, leptons, quarks and
antiquarks that can be further decomposed to reveal such ‘particles’ as
hyperons, pions, strange quarks and charmed quarks have proliferated.
As subatomic physicists have developed new tools to
observe their domain, astrophysicists have developed new tools to observe the
cosmos. Using instruments of astronomical spectroscopy, Vesto Slipher[46]
made a remarkable number of discoveries.
Although some of this early observational data was sketchy, Edwin Hubble
(1929) hypothesized that the apparent “redshifts” in light emitted from nearby
galaxies were related to the movement of those galaxies. He showed that the galaxies were moving away
from the earth and hence that the universe was expanding.[47] This prediction supported Einstein’s theory
of relativity (although Einstein hadn’t liked this implication and had added a
correction factor to keep the universe constant[48]),
and more recent observations continue to support this conjecture. The invention
of radio telescopes which allowed researches to identify such things as quasars
also allowed Penzias and Wilson to determine “a fundamental fact of nature:
constant microwave background radiation permeates the universe.”[49]
These discoveries gave credibility to the idea proposed in 1948 by Gamow that a
great event had occurred in the distant past producing great radiation, (this
theory was sarcastically dubbed “The Big Bang Theory”) and further supported
Einstein’s equations.
About the same time Hubble was examining other
galaxies, Fritz Swickky was observing, or perhaps not observing would be more
correct, radiation from all parts the universe. He felt something was missing and postulated
the existence of dark matter. Today most
astronomers believe that “as much as 90 percent of the stuff constituting the
universe may be objects or particles that cannot be seen . . . Understanding
something you cannot see is difficult--but not impossible. Not surprisingly, astronomers currently study
dark matter by its effects on the bright matter that we do observe.” [50]
Black holes are thought to be one of the many possibilities of the dark matter
in the universe. The existence of black
holes was another prediction of Einstein’s general theory of relativity.
However, black holes are an enigma, massive yet
minuscule. Einstein’s theory breaks down
in the miniscule quantum world and quantum theory is inadequate to deal with
enormous gravitation. During the course
of his life, Einstein had sought a grand unifying theory, GUT, to unite his
general theory of relativity with the theories describing subatomic behavior
without success. Theories of Everything,
reminiscent of Einstein’s GUT, such as superstring theory[51]
pioneered by Edward Witten are current attempts to unite the two worlds. However these theories have become more and
more abstract and are based on mathematical models and logical thinking with
scarce observational evidence available to support or refute them. “Many critics worry that cosmological science
is in danger of becoming a new kind of mythology, with little possible
connection with testable science.” [52]
Einstein had expressed concern about the trend in
theoretic physics to rely on mathematics, models and logic. “Pure logical
thinking cannot yield us any knowledge of the empirical world; all knowledge of
reality starts from experience and ends in it. Propositions arrived at by
purely logical means are completely empty as regards reality. Because Galileo saw this, and particularly
because he drummed it into the scientific world, he is the father of modern
physics—indeed, of modern science altogether.”[53]
20th Century Consciousness: studying
perception with observation
The discoveries of physics and the apparent limits to
observation have spurred the timeless debates about the nature of knowledge and
truth and the role of observation. How do human beings know about the physical
world? How certain is that knowledge? What is the relationship between human
perception and the real world? Is observation a means of securing reliable
knowledge?
During the 20th century, the mind, the
idea of consciousness and human behavior were critically examined from a
variety of perspectives. While some
examined perception and language as elemental parts of conscious awareness,
others felt they could not be extracted from the whole of consciousness and
analyzed independently. Alternatively
others considered the evolutionary roots of perception and language and the
functional advantages they provided. Yet others considered perception as an
innate conversion of sense data into linguistic code. Finally some focused on the philosophical
implications, of these various perspectives. The number of 20th
century scientists and philosophers who have contemplated the nature of
observation and the implications for science is mind-boggling. I will attempt
to summarize a few notable positions.
Certain fundamental assumptions guided scientific and
philosophical thought in the first half of the century. Some assumed that
everything in nature including human consciousness could be understood in terms
of elemental laws of nature and that the components of consciousness could be
separately examined. In contrast, others saw consciousness as distinct and
irreducible and felt that conscious awareness was affected by experience, society
and culture and must therefore be studied in context. A third group focused on the function of
consciousness and the evolutionary advantage elements of consciousness provide.
Finally a fourth group combined ideas from all three, believing that although
human consciousness was not observable, the laws governing behavior could be
gleaned by observing behavior as a function of environment. Although these distinctions may be somewhat
forced when applied to certain individuals, they allow me to organize this
period of history into strands of thought.
Thus, I will then follow these four strands: one beginning with the
structuralism of Wundt, a second with the pragmatism of James, a third with the
Gestalt movement initiated by Wertheimer, Koffka and Kohler, the finally a last
progression beginning with the behaviorism of Watson.
Structuralism
and Logical Positivism
At the
turn of the century, Wilhem Wundt, the physiologist and philosopher mentioned
earlier, was a founding figure in the newly emerging science of psychology.
Wundt, like many researchers of this time, was interested in the physiology
underlying perception in humans. But
Wundt took his investigations a step further and considered perception as an
elemental unit of conscious experience.
He adopted a strict methodology of observation, experimentation and
introspection, (the observation of one's own conscious mental states and
processes as they occur). He wanted to
emulate the success of physics. As physicists had discovered elemental particles
by examining the structure of matter, so to would he discover the fundamental
units of conscious experience by examining the structures of the mind, (an idea
that would be extended by his student Titchner). Wundt preferred pure observation of the
individual or introspection as he termed it over experimentation: “Experiment
is observation connected with an intentional interference on the part of
the observer, in the rise and course of the phenomena observed. Observation,
in its proper sense, the investigation of phenomena without such
interference, just as they are naturally presented to the observer in the
continuity of experience.[54]
Upon examining perception, Wundt found that
there were, “psychical elements of two kinds, corresponding to the two
factors contained in immediate experience, the objective contents [sensations]
and the experiencing subject [emotions].[55]
Wundt then further decomposes these factors into smaller units. He coined the term apperception to
describe how the mind organized these perceptual units and psychical elements
into larger wholes. (This idea that the
whole mind resulted from the associations of simple sensations can be traced to
James Mill and John Hartley in the 18th century).[56]
Although Wundt did not see consciousness as the simple sum of the parts, he
initiated a mechanistic approach to the study of cognition.
Concurrently, Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) applied the
same kind of mechanistic logic in his philosophy, which he described in Philosophy
of Logical Atomism (1918-19). He asserted that there are fundamental
elements of language just as there are fundamental elements of nature. Language was the link between perception and
understanding. Russell also argued (like
Hume) that
there was an innate link between sensory experience and the physical
world. For Russell, ”it seems as if the sense-datum itself were
instinctively believed to be the independent object, whereas argument shows
that the object cannot be identical with the sense-datum. This discovery,
however -- which is not at all paradoxical in the case of taste and smell and
sound, and only slightly so in the case of touch -- leaves undiminished our instinctive
belief that there are objects corresponding to our sense-data. Since
this belief does not lead to any difficulties, but on the contrary tends to
simplify and systematize our account of our experiences, there seems no good
reason for rejecting it. We may therefore admit -- though with a slight doubt
derived from dreams -- that the external world does really exist, and is not
wholly dependent for its existence upon our continuing to perceive it.” [57] The question for Russell was not whether the
external world really exists but how do human beings know about it. For him, the connection between the world and
our knowledge of the world was made not simply through sense data but also
through language.
A student and then colleague of Russell, Edmund Wittgenstein
(1859-1951) considered that connection between language and the world more
fully. In his early work Tractatus (1922), he suggested that the purpose
of language was to reveal the world and that elemental propositions of language
create a picture of reality. This was
his ‘picture theory’. Later,
Wittgenstein came to reject the assumption that language must share a common logical form
with nature, however this early work was
quite influential in focusing research and debate. In particular his contention that only
verifiable statements of fact, e.g. scientific observation, were meaningful
profoundly influenced the Vienna Circle.
The Vienna Circle was a group of
scientists, philosophers and mathematicians, including Moritz Schlick
(1882-1936), Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), and Kurt Gödel (1906-78), who met
regularly to discuss scientific language and scientific methodology. Strongly influenced by Ernst Mach (the official name of the Vienna Circle was Verein
Ernst Mach or Ernst Mach Association)[58], Albert Einstein, and Wittgenstein, these ’logical
positivists’ felt that anything that was not empirically verifiable was
meaningless. Only knowledge that came
through empirical experience rather than knowledge that came through logical
reasoning was valid. The Vienna Circle
saw an underlying unity of process across the sciences and sought to unite the
sciences through two series of publications: Papers of scientific world-view
and an Encyclopaedia of the Unified Sciences. Although the members of the Vienna Circle were
dispersed in the late 1930s when Nazi party came into power in Germany, they continued to have
great influence on the progress of thought in the latter half of the century.
Karl Popper (1902-1994) had
many contacts with the Vienna Circle that published his Logik der Forschung, (The logic of scientific discovery) in 1934 as part of the Papers of scientific
world-view. Although, Popper was a
staunch supporter of the sciences he was not a positivist, in the sense that he
did not believe that scientific observation verified facts. Because
he agreed with Hume, that induction from observation couldn’t lead to logical
truth, he argued against Bacon’s “myth
of a scientific method that starts from observation and experiment and then
proceeds to theories.”[59]. Popper believed that science starts with
problems not with observations. Although
observations are often cited as the initiating factor for an inquiry, upon
closer examination, it can be argued that observations become the source of
inquiry because they are somehow problematic – they don’t fit current ideas or
theories.[60] Popper later noted (in the sixties) that many
theories are equally plausible in explaining observations and the observations
themselves are fallible: “All observation involves interpretation in the light
of theories, and that what they call 'observable' is what is observable
in the light of pretty old-fashioned and primitive theories.”[61]
Thus Popper believed that scientific theories should
not be inductively inferred from experience and that scientific experimentation
should not be carried out with a view of verifying theories. Instead science
should begin with problems to be solved and theories that can be
falsified. Popper asserted that criticism
is “our main instrument in promoting the growth of our knowledge about the
world of facts.” Scientific progress is thus made through a series of
“conjectures and refutations” in a critical-feedback process analogous to
Darwin’s evolutionary view. Later Kuhn
would dispute Popper’s idealized view of science, but that would extend this
strand too far into the latter half of the century.
Gestalt Psychology and Phenomenology
Whereas Wundt was looking for underlying structures
of perception and the elemental steps out of which conscious awareness arises,
another group of German psychologists was developing a very different
conception of consciousness. In sharp
contrast to Wundt, Wertheimer (1880-1943), Kurt Koffka (1886-1941) and Wolfgang
Kohler (1887-1967) argued that consciousness was made up of organized wholes or
‘Gestalten’. Wertheimer used the example
of the line drawing of the duck/rabbit to demonstrate that the mind constructed
a whole image, either one or the other.
The gestalt psychologist believed that the organization of the brain must
parallel this holistic organization revealed by perception.[62] In addition, Gestalt psychologists believed
that because organisms do not exist in isolation, they should not be considered
in isolation but as part of the whole.
Wertheirmer asserted that, “The programme to treat the organism as a
part in a larger field necessitates the reformulation of the problem as to the
relation between organism and environment. The stimulus-sensation connection
must be replaced by a connection between alteration in the field conditions,
the vital situation, and the total reaction of the organism by a change in its
attitude, striving, and feeling.”[63]
Thus the Gestalt methodology was quite distinct from that of the
structuralist.
Much of the
early work of the Gestalt psychologies concerned perception and illusion. In
1922, Kurt Koffka, introduced Gestalt theory to his fellow psychologists by
demonstrating its application in the study of perception.[64]
In 1923, Max Wertheimer outlines the principles between stimulus and experience
in the Laws of Organization in Perceptual Forms. They
made it clear that what is understood by the perceiver is not always an
accurate description of the thing which is perceived, but instead perception is
profoundly affected by a variety of external and internal factors. It is
interesting to note that while the Vienna Circle courted Einstein, members of
the Gestalt group interacted with Planck, Born and Heisenberg. In fact the
Gestalt psychologists tired to use physics analogies to describe such things as
perception. This is quite notable in
the later Kohler article, Gestalt Psychology Today[65]
in which Kohler draws analogies between forces in physics and such things as
motivational forces in focusing attention he then uses vectors to describe the
direction or action of the force. He
further suggests that a goal of Gestalt psychology is to understand the fields
or forces acting in and upon the brain.
The philosophy of phenomenology developed in parallel
to Gestalt psychology. Introduced by
Husserl (1859-1938), phenomenology was based on the belief that our knowledge
is limited by our conscious awareness of the natural world. Our conception of a natural object is not a
true representation but a phenomenon dependent on a variety of factors. In his
words, “Rather than just the
thoroughgoing unity of intuition, the variously, changing modes in which the
unity is present, e.g., the continuously changing perspectival looks of a real
object, are also called "phenomena."[66] Thus
observation does not yield a true picture of what is real but a context-bound
representation. The influence of this idea can be seen in later Wittgenstein
works and in the thinking of Thomas Kuhn.
Husserl’s philosophy reflects the transcendental notions
of Kant and Cartesian duality of mind and body.
Thus he views consciousness as distinct and separate. In Husserl's
words: "we fix our eyes steadily upon the sphere of Consciousness and
study what it is that we find immanent in it.... Consciousness in itself has a
being of its own which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected
by the phenomenological disconnection."
This position is quite distinct from that of, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) who departs from classical phenomenology by
emphasizing the relationship between consciousness and the world. Merleau-Ponty's major work: Phenomenology
of Perception was published in 1945. John Lechte comments, “Pitting himself
directly against the abstractness and emptiness of the Cartesian cogito - 'I
think, therefore I am' - Merleau-Ponty shows that 'to be a body is to be tied
to a certain world'; and he adds: 'our body is not primarily in space: it is of
it'. In effect, our body is always already in the world; therefore, there is no
body in-itself, a body which could be objectified and given universal status.”[67]
Functionalism
While Wundt, and the Gestalt psychologists were
following their respective paths, William James (1842-1910), an American,
introduced an alternative route to the understanding of perception and
conscious awareness that avoided the metaphysical dispute of whether one could
really determine elemental laws that governed consciousness. He characterized his method as “looking
away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of
looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, fasts.”[68]
James felt that in this manner a practical understanding of human behavior
could be developed. He did not believe
consciousness could be reduced to basic elements and likened it to a
continuously changing stream. “Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself
chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it
fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed;
it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most
naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream
of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life....”[69]
However, James did believe that consciousness could
be studied as a science. His approach
was pragmatic and found its roots in the Darwinian notions of functional
adaptation. Research focused on cause
and effect, prediction and control, and observation of behavior in the context
of its environment. Like Wundt, James
was not a materialist as he commented, “I cannot see how such a thing as our
consciousness can possibly be produced by
a nervous machinery, though I can perfectly well see how, if 'ideas' do
accompany the workings of the machinery, the order
of the ideas might very well follow exactly the order of the machine's operations.” [70] Unlike Wundt however, James did not focus on
finding the components of consciousness, “A disembodied human emotion is a
sheer non-entity.”[71]
James was profoundly
influenced by philosopher, Charles
Pierce, the founder of Pragmatism. James
felt pragmatism offered a middle ground between the Empiricists and
Rationalists. “Empiricists . . . are not
uncommonly materialistic, and their optimism is apt to be decidedly conditional
and tremulous. Rationalism is always monistic. It starts from wholes and
universals, and makes much of the unity of things. Empiricism starts from the
parts, and makes of the whole a collection - is not averse therefore to calling
itself pluralistic…” On the one hand James felt that Pragmatism could combine
the best of both points of view. “It can
remain religious like the rationalisms, but at the same time, like the
empiricisms, it can preserve the richest intimacy with facts. … To attain
perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider
what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve -what
sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our
conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the
whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive
significance at all.” [72]
George
Mead (1863-1931) and John Dewey (1859-1952), like James, supported
pragmatism or as Dewey termed it ‘instrumentalism’. Mead's theory of the emergence of mind and
self out of social process and Dewey’s theory of knowledge as the product of
the interaction between an organism and its environment became foundational in
the fields of modern sociology and education respectively. Like the Gestalt psychologists, they believed
that things could not be understood in isolation but needed to be viewed in
context.
Both Mead and Dewey had strong
opinions on observation and the scientific method, voiced in Mead’s Scientific
Method and the Individual Thinker and Dewey’s How we think. Dewey supports induction from observation as
well as deduction as a valid means of obtaining knowledge. “The inductive movement is toward discovery of a binding principle; the
deductive toward its testing confirming,
refuting, modifying it on the basis of its capacity to interpret isolated
details into a unified experience. So far as we conduct each of these processes
in the light of the other, we get valid discovery or verified critical
thinking. “[73] However,
knowledge need only be functional to be valid, its ultimate truth is an
unnecessary consideration. Mead
introduced the importance of social process in his examination of the
scientific method and points out that scientific observation is subject to “the
experience of the individual and to the world to which he belongs.” He goes on
to state that an individual “functions
in his full particularity, and yet in organic relationship with the society
that is responsible for him..[74]
Meads understanding of the scientific process had profound affect in the latter
half of the century.
Behaviorism
“Psychology,
as the behaviorist views it, is a purely objective experimental branch of
natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior.
Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific
value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves
to interpretation in terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his efforts to
get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between
man and brute. The behavior of man, with all of its refinement and complexity,
forms only a part of the behaviorist's total scheme of investigation.”[75]
In this way, John Watson (1878-1958) defines behaviorism
and separates his view of psychology from the structuralists who used
introspection to examine consciousness. He further distinguishes the
behaviorist’s perspective from not only structuralism but also functionalism by
disregarding the notion of consciousness. “Behaviorism claims that
consciousness is neither a definite nor a usable concept. The behaviorist ...
holds, further, that belief in the existence of consciousness goes back to the
ancient days of superstition and magic...”[76].
The methodology of the behaviorist was in some ways
similar to that of the phenomenologist who observes behavior as a whole and
considers the environmental and historical context, yet they were quite
distinct in their explanations of the phenomenon they observed. The belief that all behavior was explainable
in terms of stimulus - response reflexes is typified by Edward Thorndike’s ‘law of effect’: which states that behavior
is learned through trial-and-error and is more likely to occur is its
consequences are satisfying.
B.F. Skinner (1904-90) advanced this view further by describing
thinking as a trial-and-error process: “Thinking
is then largely a verbal process; occasionally expressive movements
substitutable for word movements (gestures, attitudes, etc.) enter in as a part
of the general stream of implicit activity. Thinking, in the narrow sense where
learning is involved, is a trial-and-error process wholly similar to manual
trial and error. “[77]
Skinner’s connection of thought with language, thought with trial and error
provides stimulus for many scientists and philosophers.
The Current Debate
The
century had begun with uncertainty in science, but the war, eugenics, and the
bomb brought a different kind of uncertainty to science. The process by which such destructive
artifacts could develop was now to be questioned with great rigor. Many individuals who lived through this
period developed a cynical view of scientific practice. Some describe this as
the postmodern worldview.[78]
During
the first half of the century observation was shown to be dependent on
perception and on language and on society. All these dependencies are being examined
from multiple perspectives. These perspectives do not lend themselves to simple
organization. The system I used to organize the first half of the century
breaks down as strands entangle and fragment or dwindle in significance. Also, It is difficult to know which
individuals and which ideas from this period will stand up to the test of
time. Who and what will be significant a
hundred or a thousand years hence? Thus
I apologize if I miss major contributors to thought. I have elected to use Carnap’s ideas as a
starting point. I will then follow several distinct paths of those who support
or extend his ideas and those who oppose or diverge from his thinking.
In the 1940s, Carnap immigrated to the United States
and began to participate in a Logic group with Russell and Quine among
others. His attention focused on logic,
language and science. In Observational
Language and Theoretical Language, (1958), Carnap describes observational
language as sense-datum language and tried to draw a distinction between
observational and theoretical terms used in science; although he admitted that
this distinction is not always clear. He
wanted to show that only verifiable statements, grounded in observed facts were
true, while theoretical statements had no claim to truth. His friend and
colleague Willard Quine opposed his position and I will return to his argument
shortly.
Not only was Carnap concerned with the verifiability
of observational language, he was also concerned with the verifiability of
observations themselves. Hume’s argument
against generalizations made from observations greatly disturbed Carnap. Throughout his later years he tried to find
solutions to Hume’s induction problem, using probability theory (Logical
Foundations of Probability, 1950 and The Continuum of Inductive Methods1952). Although he argued that induction could be
supported using a probability theory, his early attempts were
unsuccessful. He was still working on
the theory of inductive logic when he died in 1970. At the time of his death, he was trying to
incorporate thermodynamic considerations of enthalpy and entropy into his
theory but was unable to complete this work.
Several other
individuals have been interested in a probabilistic justification for
induction. Although Popper argued that
many theories could be inductively derived to explain a set of observations and
that the probability of all scientific theories was zero, Bayesians
disagree. Using probability theory they
propose that certain inductive inferences are more probable then others and
that scientists can have confidence in their inductive reasoning using a kind
of probabilities statistical analysis. Individuals such as C. Howson, P. Urback
defend this approach to scientific reasoning, while opponents like Chalmers
dispute its usefulness pointing out the it relies on belief in the validity of
observations and evidence gathered.
Chalmers voices his concern as follows: “… is it not the case that we
seek an account of what counts as appropriate evidence in science? Certainly a scientist will respond to some
evidential claim, not by asking the scientist making the claim how strongly he
or she believes it, but by seeking information on the nature of the experiment
that yielded the evidence, what precautions were taken, how errors were
estimated and so on.”[79]
He suggests we regard the Bayesian account of induction as a failure.[80]
This does not deter Richard Jeffrey, (currently
President of the Philosophy of Science Association and Professor Emeritus at
Princeton and distinguished lecturer at UCI) a strong advocate for the Bayesian
approach. Jeffrey describes himself as a
former logical positivist, but “now a septuagenariam radical probabalist.”[81]
Influenced by Carnap and Quine, he is comfortable with his solution to Hume’s
dilemma which he describes in Probabilistic Thinking (1995). He comments, “ It seems to me that Hume did not pose his problem
before the means were at hand to solve it, in the probabilism that emerged in
the second half of the seventeenth century, and that we know today primarily in
the form that Bruno de Finetti gave it in the decade from 1928 to 1938.”[82] Using the following cartoon to illustrate the
implausibility of certain occurrences, Jeffrey’s argues for a probabilistic
epistemology and mathematically continues to defend scientific induction as a
valid mode of judgment. Others within the artificial intelligence
community are using inductive algorithms to emulate human thinking.
The idea that machines could emulate thinking can by
traced back to the likes of Alan Turing (1912-1954). Turing was a colleague of Wittgenstein and
was also working on the idea of elemental language only his elemental language
was a programming language which could be used by machines. Both Wittgenstein, and Turing realized the limits
of logical language systems (this conclusion was supported by the Church-Turing
Theorem [84]
and Kurt Goedel’s Incompleteness Theorem[85]). Logic like observation could not lead
directly to true knowledge. Biographer, Daniel Dennett describes how Turing and
Wittgenstein saw this weakness of logic,
“For
Turing, the problem is a practical one: if you design a bridge using a system
that contains a contradiction, ‘the bridge may fall down.’ For Wittgenstein,
the problem was about the social context in which human beings can be said to
"follow the rules" of a mathematical system. What Turing saw, and
Wittgenstein did not, was the importance of the fact that a computer doesn't
need to understand rules to follow them. Who "won"? Turing comes off
as somewhat flatfooted and naive, but he left us the computer, while
Wittgenstein left us...Wittgenstein.”[86]
Indeed,
Turing proposed the creation of a machine
“... which can be made to do the work of any special-purpose machine, that
is to say to carry out any piece of computing, if a tape bearing suitable
"instructions" is inserted into it.” [87]
More than this however, Turing reintroduced the mechanistic view of mind, which
Kant and Hegel had made unpopular. In
1948, Turing states: “A man provided
with paper, pencil, and rubber, and subject to strict discipline, is in effect
a universal machine.”[88] Later he becomes even more convinced of the
power of computing machines: “One day
ladies will take their computers for walks in the park and tell each other, 'My
little computer said such a funny thing this morning!”[89]
This was the advent of the computational theory of the mind and of the computer
age.
A
coalescence of individuals spurred by Turing’s ideas, from diverse fields of
interest (e.g. linguistics, ethology, sociology, education) began in the
1950s. They were all interested in
understanding how humans and animals think and were discouraged by the kind of
“black box” model of the mind that the behaviorists like Skinner supported. They became somewhat unified under the
heading of Cognitive Science.
Significant in the establishment of this field (and limited for the
purposes of this paper) are Noam Chomsky, Allen Newell, David Rumelhart
& James McClelland, and George Miller.
Chomsky sees language not as Skinner had
described it (as a kind of stimulus response behavior) but as a cognitive
process. Further, he purports
that we are born with principles of language (nature, not just nurture) and
these are ‘wired’ into our brain. This
combined with Turing’s vision has led to a number of individuals to actively
work on a computational model of the mind. Notable in this effort have been the
computer scientists Alan Newell, Herbert Simon, and Marvin Minsky, and the
philosophers Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor.
Computational theory of mind (CTM) “holds that
the mind is a digital computer: a discrete-state device that stores symbolic
representations and manipulates them according to syntactic rules; that
thoughts are mental representations.“[90] It is a symbol-based system.
In
the 1980’s an alternative view emerged. In a paper entitled Parallel
Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, (1986), Rumelhart
and McCelland proposed a neural network theory of cognition, now called
connectionism. Connectionism holds that the mind in a
collection of neural networks which can be modeled using a multi-layer network
of neuron-like processing units. It works
using subsymbols. Fundamentally, both
models presuppose that the creation of human-like thinking machines is
possible.
George
Miller began as a behaviorist but his interest shifted as he wanted to
understand the mental processes behind the behavior he witnessed. In his most famous paper, (The
Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for
Processing Information,1956) he argued
that the short term memory could only hold about seven pieces or chunks of
information. This idea of chunking
became a basic element in theories of memory. In the 1960s, he founded the
Center for Cognitive Studies and Harvard (along with Jerome Brume).
Cognitive
scientists, like Philip Johnson-Laird, argue
that perception, ideas, beliefs and the like are all treatable as mental
representations or symbols. In Foundations of
Cognitive Science, Johnson-Laird describes the “phenomenological experience of the world” as
“a triumph of natural selection. We seem
to perceive the world directly, not a representation of it. Yet this phenomenology is illusory: what we perceive depends on both what is in
the world and what is in our heads—on what evolution has ‘wired’ into our
nervous systems and what we know as a result of experience. “[91]
Linguist
and sociobiologist, Robin Allott, agrees with Johnson-Laird that evolution has
pre-wired our brains for perception.
Allott departs however in her description of the phenomenon of
perception. Allott sees perception as
the “result of physiological and neurological evolution of the system of sense
organs and nerves.”[92]
Further, Allott purports that evolution has ensured that our perception of the
world gives us true knowledge of the world and that language is inextricably
linked to perception. Allott goes on to
state, “We need no longer distrust our own reasoning or our belief in the
reality of causation in the external world.
The intellectual development of mankind can proceed, as it is doing, but
on a philosophically more secure basis and in the knowledge that language, as a
flexible instrument designed to match the open-endedness of human experience
(perception and action) can be a reliable medium for exploring, recording and
developing man’s knowledge of the external world and of his own nature.” Allott believes that Kantian anthropocentric
forms of understanding have misguided us in beleiving that consciousness was
transcendent rather than dependent on nature.
Neurobiologist
like Antonio Damasio and Neurophilosophers like Paul and Patricia Churchland
would agree. “Whereas Kant, a dyed-in-the-wool anti-reductionist, was convinced
that the nature of the self was forever unresearchable empirically, Damasio
finds places where scientific progress is possible; whereas Kant thought of the
self in terms of a highly mysterious ‘transcendental unity of apperception’,
Damasio gives it a reassuringly concrete base in terms of neural representation
of the body: the skin, muscles, joints, viscera, and so forth. “[93]
Neurobiologists in general believe they can discover the biological basis for
consciousness by examining and modeling the brain and its processes.
Although, Willard Quine (1908- ) favorably reviewed
Paul Churchland’s book The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (1995)
calling it “an outstanding philosophical achievement, integrating artificial
intelligence, brain neurology, cognitive psychology, ethnology, epistemology,
scientific method, and even ethics and aesthetics, into an interlocking
whole"[94]
his own philosophy has developed along different lines. Quine was originally a colleague of Carnap,
participating in the same Logic Circle at Harvard in the 40s. He disagreed with
Carnap’s description of language, particularly scientific language. In The Verification Theory and
Reductionism (1951), Quine argued that Carnap’s attempt to reduce language
to sense-data language (or analytic language) and theoretical language (or
synthetic language) was misguided and did not lead to the conclusion that only
sense-data language statements were true.
“My present suggestion is that it is nonsense, and the root of much
nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the
truth of any individual statement. Taken collectively, science has its double
dependence upon language and experience; but this duality is not significantly
traceable into the statements of science taken one by one. “ Although he
defends empiricism it is from the point of view of a pragmatist. “As an empiricist I continue to think of the
conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future
experience in the light of past experience. …The myth of physical objects is
epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than
other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of
experience. …. Each man is given a scientific heritage plus a continuing
barrage of sensory stimulation; and the considerations which guide him in
warping his scientific heritage to fit his continuing sensory promptings are,
where rational, pragmatic.”[95]
Quine went on to develop a naturalized epistemology of science. Although he
does not claim science gives us true knowledge, he contends that science is our
best bet. He also suggests that the only was to understand the
nature of scientific knowledge is to describe the way in which that knowledge
was acquired and accepted by the scientific community. This is very compatible with Dewey’s
philosophy.
Although engaged by Carnap to write a volume for the International
Encyclopaedia, Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) like Quine did not agree with
Carnap’s vision of science. In his publication, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (196) Kuhn examined Popper’s vision for the ‘scientific method’
and compared it to historical accounts of scientific practice. He found that Popper’s idealized model was
not realized in practice. Instead, Kuhn determined that scientific ‘truth
claims’ were context-specific and theory-dependent. He stated, “There is, I think, no
theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the notion
of a match between the ontology of a theory and its "real"
counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle.”[96] In addition, Kuhn argued that
scientists work within paradigms that affect their objectivity, their selection
of observable facts and their interpretation of those facts. When anomalies
between observations and theory become too great, paradigmatic crises
occurs. During these periods of crisis,
a revolution in thought may transpire during which scientists will adopt a new
paradigm under which they will continue to work until the next revolution.
Kuhn’s model
envelopes many of Mead’s ideas about the influence of society on scientific
thought. It had further fueled the
debate about the validity of observation, validity of logic and truth in
science.
This led Kuhn's friend and
colleague Paul Feyerabend (1924-1996) to the conclusion that the acquisition of
scientific knowledge is no different than the acquisition of any other kind of
knowledge. It holds no special value. “Scientists do not solve problems because they
possess a magic wand - methodology, or a theory of rationality - but because
they have studied a problem for a long time, because they know the situation
fairly well, because they are not too dumb (though that is rather doubtful
nowadays when almost anyone can become a scientist), and because the excesses
of one scientific school are almost always balanced by the excesses of some
other school. (Besides, scientists only rarely solve their problems, they make
lots of mistakes, and many of their solutions are quite useless.) Basically
there is hardly any difference between the process that leads to the
announcement of a new scientific law and the process preceding passage of a new
law in society: one informs either all citizens or those immediately concerned,
one collects 'facts' and prejudices, one discusses the matter, and one finally
votes. But while a democracy makes some effort to explain the process so
that everyone can understand it, scientists either conceal it, or bend
it, to make it fit their sectarian interests.”[97] Feyerabend’s position is seen by some as
‘anti-science’ because it diminishes the status of scientific thought. It is certainly contrary to Quine’s
naturalism. Feyerabend’s arguments can
been seen applied by Philip Clayton who writes for the Journal of Religion
& Science: “The quest for scientific explanations, on one hand, and the
formation and use of religious beliefs, on the other, might then be seen as two
of the diverse ways in which humans attempt to make sense of their total
experience.” [98] However, Clayton like many others is not
willing to accept the Feyerabends position that anything goes, that scientists
have no definable methods and no boundaries for their actions.
The arguments of Hume, Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend
are combined in the philosophy of Derek Hodson.
Hodson argues in a series of articles and a book Teaching and
Learning Science (1998) that myths have developed around scientific
practice and epistemology. Hodson
believes these myths are distortions of the reality of scientific
practice. The first three are relevant
to this discussion[99]:
1.
Observation
provides direct and reliable access to secure knowledge.
2.
Science starts
with observation.
3.
Science proceeds
via induction.
Hodson does not argue that science is relativistic
but rather the knowledge obtained is not certain, nor for that matter are the
methodologies. Hodson states, “ that
observation is unreliable and theory-dependent.”[100]
Science has evolved to the point where scientists often begin from theory or
theory-laden observations far removed from sense-data, and thus does not simply
begin with a scientist observing the world around him or herself. Further, he accepts Hume’s argument that
induction does not provide reliable knowledge and that scientific progress
requires an array of alternative approaches. He states simply, “Scientific
method, as practiced by the community of scientists, is the means by which we
obtain knowledge about the physical world….Science proceeds through a three
stage process: an individual stage, a
community stage and an objective stage. … a new finding is the product of a
complex social activity which precedes and follows the individual act of
discovery or creation.”[101] Hodson does not accept however that
scientific knowledge is a social construct or that rationality is simply a
convention. He believes, “There are
limiting features in the world, there is order and stability. If there were not, we could not perceive
it. The way that we discriminate must,
in part, be due to stable features in our environment.”[102]
Given that underlying stability Hodson feels, “a scientist aims at a true
description of the world and a true explanation of observable facts. … But he
cannot know for certain that his findings are true.”[103]
One
interesting way of testing scientific ‘truths’ or any proposition for that
matter has been suggested by a former member of the Vienna Circle, Friedrich
Wallner. In 1998, Wallner presented A New
Vision of Science to the
Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy.
Wallner is a constructive realist who agrees with Kuhn that that there
is more than ‘one way of rationality’.
But even if the ‘truth’ of a scientific proposition may not be known, we
can understand its limits through a process he calls strangification. “In
short, strangification means to take a proposition system out of its framework
and into the framework of another scientific microworld.” He adds, ”By
strangification you find the demarcations of your proposition systems, you get
insight into your presuppositions and into the relations between the
microworlds and the environment. In other words, you gain knowledge and you
understand what you have done to the world with your presuppositions.[104]
Another proposition,
called new experimentalism has been introduced to explain and justify
scientific progress. In a movement away from the radical theory dependence of
science, some philosophers of science have begun to examine experiments
themselves as the crucial factor in defining science and validating scientific
knowledge. Experiments it is argued can
be theory independent. Chalmers gives
the example of Faraday’s motor. “Faraday
discovered a new experimental effect, demonstrated it by construction a version
of his device that did work, and gave instructions to his rivals than enabled
them to build devices that worked too. “[105]
The fact that Faraday’s motor worked is independent of any theories or
presuppositions. Although the theories
generated to explain the experimental effect may be incorrect, they must
account for the observation that it does indeed occur. This Chalmers contends gives us a
theory-independent means of understanding the progress of science by examining
science as a progression of experimental effects and explanations for those
effects. Rather than Popper’s
falsification procedure, Deborah Mayo a ‘new experimentalism’ philosopher of
science suggests that a scientific claim “can only be said to be borne out by
experiment if it has been severely tested by experiment, and a severest test of
a claim, …must be such that the claim would be unlikely to pass it if it were
false.”[106] Thus
the observed effect of an experiment becomes critical in defining scientific
progress.
On
a less metaphysical note, scientific practice continues and educators must
contend with the complexity of this issue.
One attempt to incorporate many of the various factors affecting
observation and theory into a new model for students has been developed by Craig
Rusbult (currently a chemistry professor at the
1.
Hypothetico-Deductive Logic, and Empirical
Factors in Theory Evaluation
2.
Conceptual Factors in Theory Evaluation
3.
Cultural-Personal Factors in Theory Evaluation
4.
Theory Evaluation
and
5.
Theory Generation
6.
Experimental Design (Generation-and-Evaluation)
7.
Problem-Solving Projects
8.
Thought Styles
9.
Mental Operations
The following schematic, illustrates the flow and possible interaction between these processes.
This is
one of many such models, but is perhaps the most complete in illustrating the
complexity of the scientific process and the various roles that observation can
take.
Conclusions:
The advent of the new millennium sees no
conclusion to the debate about the role of observation in science. In some communities it is a myth that science
comes from observation while paradoxically in others it is felt that science
becomes myth when it leaves its observational roots. Such word games led Wittgenstein to reject
the debate altogether, while others continue to forage for understanding.
The source of the dilemma resides in the
definition of science. “What is
this Thing Called Science?” It has been
asked, but not successfully answered. As
I look over the history I included, I see my own bias in what I considered to
be science before the word “science” existed.
My own view of science as the empirical study of nature, assumes that
science begins with observation. For
those who view science as a means to solve problems, science begins with the
formulation of a problem that may be solved with or without direct observation.
For those who view science as experimentation, science begins with an
experiment. And one could go on. At what point does science become a distinct
way of knowing and of doing, … That is the stuff of another paper.
Although, the essence of science is not
clear, it is clear that observation has played a critical role in the history
of science, without it science would not be.
It is also clear that science cannot proceed by observation alone. Within the mind of the scientist, there is
the interplay between observation and reason and the more nebulous elements
like intuition and imagination.
Observations themselves are dependent on prior knowledge and are further
shaped by the language used to express them. Around the scientist is a society
with customs and rules for language and for logic and views about the world,
which also influence the thoughts and actions of the scientist. And too, there is the physical world, which
hopefully constrains the observant scientist to a bounded set of rational
possibilities.
Scientists
will continue to observe and to look for correlations and causalities but more
importantly they will continue to question those observations and theories and
to test them using experimentation and reason for that is fundamentally the
only way for science to proceed.